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Myanmar’s Buddhists move toward political mainstream

Симония Аида Алексеевна

Религия и общество на Востоке '2015, №0, с.74-83

Объем издания: 74-83

 
The paper deals with the changes in Myanmar political life, particularly after the transfer of power to the nominal civil administration. Local political life is getting through a period of transformation that reflects both growing religiously colored nationalism and the dominant role of Buddhism in of Myanmar’s new civilian government. Domestic policy toward Muslim minority has to cope with the increased communal and sectarian violence. All that creates new social tensions that are further heated by the growth of militant Islamism in external world, the Middle East and Central Asia

Ключевые слова: Theravada Buddhism, Muslim diaspora, anti-Muslim sentiments, Buddhist–Muslim tensions, nationalism, changes in confessional legislation, political transformation, Myanmar political life.

One of the most concerning developments in any nascent democracy is the institutionalization and mainstreaming of extremist ideologies. The countries undergoing through political transition are most susceptible to these shifts at a time when the new institutions are too weak and powerful groups spring up trying to manipulate nationalist and religious sentiments. They reassert the values of tradition warning that any sort of change – political or demographic – would be inherently threatening. They gain widespread popular support for policies or actions that in other contexts would be perceived as extremist.

Myanmar is no exception to this. Five years ago, in 2011, the military junta transferred power to the nominal civic administration. Myanmar’s new civilian government was taking efforts to reinforce its legitimacy as a democratic regime launching liberal reforms and the country took its first steps toward democracy. Freedom of speech reintroduced after half of a century gave an opportunity for radicals to openly spread their views and the rise of radical and nationalist elements in the country may jeopardize the government’s reform initiatives.

Nationalist radical groups are a direct byproduct of democratization – their goal is to exploit freedom of movement and information to capture the new state institutions. Historical experience and the events of recent years have shown that an authoritarian government keeps the existing different ethnic and religious groups of the population in a latent state. But when authoritarian government is either removed or weakens its control over the population for internal political reasons, as it happened in Myanmar, primordial contradictions between these groups get into the fore exacerbating the situation and leading to open and violent conflicts. The weakening of the power of the military in the regions, the lifting of restrictions in recent years has resulted in an increase of religious tension in Myanmar.

The adoption of the legislative package of the “Race and Religion Protection Bills” in 2015, which were advanced by the powerful nationalist Buddhist organization Ma Ba Tha, gave ground to some experts even to speak about the Buddhist fundamentalism. The Ma Ba Tha – an acronym for the Committee for the Protection of Race and Religion (in Burmese − Amyo Batha Thathana Kakwe Saungshaukyay Apwe) – is a powerful group of Buddhist figures largely regarded as anti-Muslim nationalists that are spreading anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Myanmar is a Buddhist country; the majority (about 90 per cent) of its multiethnic population professes Theravada Buddhism. Among them – 95 per cent are the native Burmese, Mon, Shan, Rakhine (Arakan) and up to 60 per cent are the native Karen, Kaya and Kachin people. It has often been said that Myanmar is the most profoundly Buddhist country in the world. Another name for Theravada Buddhism is Hinayana. Theravada Buddhism is a more conservative, a more orthodox form of Buddhism, than its counterpart Mahayana Buddhism, dominant in most East Asian countries.

At the same time there are significant numbers of adherents of different other religions. According to 1983 census Christianity (Protestantism and Roman Catholic) was practiced by 4,9 per cent of the population, Islam by – 3,9 per cent, Hinduism by – 0,5 per cent, primitive animist and other beliefs by – 1,3 per cent. Although better known everywhere as a Buddhist country, Myanmar is a home to a sizable Muslim population, which is officially pegged at roughly 5 percent of the total citizenry, but sometimes they account for an estimate in the range between 8 to 12 percent of the population, or roughly about 52 million. And definitely these numbers are growing. Although the country has conducted its latest census in spring 2014 the results of ethnic and religious representations haven’t been published yet[1].

Geographically Myanmar is located at the junction of the Buddhist and the Islamic words. Its neighbors on the West are Bangladesh which takes the 4th place on the number of Muslims (roughly 133 million people, or about 90 per cent of the population) and India (with 151 million of Muslims, or 13 per cent of the population). On the South Myanmar borders across the see with Indonesia – the largest country with Muslim population of about (210 million, or 88 per cent of the population) and also with Malaysia counting about 60 per cent of Muslim population. On the East the neighbors are Thailand and Laos and the population of these countries mostly professes Buddhism Theravada as in Myanmar. For many centuries the Theravada Buddhism School has thrived in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos and Cambodia and it currently accounts for about 100 million adherents.

There is a fixed stereotype of conflict-free pacifist Buddhist detachment and non-involvement in political life, but since the colonial times Burmese Buddhist monks exhibit significant social and political activity. The facts of history since the 11th century confirm this. Burmese Buddhists were active in the 19th century with their armed resistance against colonization of the country by the British. One of the driving motives of resistance movement was the protection of native Buddhist religion from Christian missionaries. Buddhist monastic community (Sangha) acted against the colonialists not only by preaching but also by force of arms. For decades many monks fought in guerilla detachments, some of them were local commanders and had displayed real valor. An important role was played by monks during the national liberation struggle in 1920 – 30s of the 20th century. Buddhism was the most important part of the process of national awakening and then of state-building under the slogan of a “Buddhist state”.

This motto was very popular during the 40s − 50s of the past century. The political system in the period of parliamentary democracy under the Prime Minister U Nu can be characterized as “Buddhist Socialism”. The decision to declare Buddhism state religion in Burma to some extent had cost him his political career. After the military coup (1962) the ideas of Buddhism have been reflected in the adoption of the official doctrine on the “Burmese way to socialism” by the Revolutionary Council.

In 1988 Burmese monks along with the students have become an important component in a powerful wave of antigovernment protests that were ended by a military coup and the brutal suppression of the democratic movement.

Today Theravada Buddhism operates in Myanmar as a major factor of political life. Over the past decades both the ruling circles of Myanmar and the opposition have used appeal to Buddhism as an important mechanism for their legitimation during theirs persistent confrontation.

After seizing power in Burma by a military junta in 1988 new leadership attempted to reinforce its legitimacy with the help of generous donations to religious institutions. Since 1991, the military leadership has invested significant financial resources into the construction and renovation of pagodas, Buddhist temples and other religious structures. Military junta has succeeded in strengthening relations with some representatives of the Supreme Sangha, some of the elders were cajoled. The military regime actively tried to use the Sangha as its ideological support base, while controlling the Buddhist community.

In turn, leader of the opposition party National League for Democracy (NLD) Aung San Suu Kyi is trying to synthesize the principles of Western liberal democracy with traditional Buddhist values. She uses rhetoric very close to the people like Buddhist concepts of love and compassion, peace and non-violence. The leader of the opposition was in isolation under house arrest for 15 years and this also had contributed to her enhanced devotion to Buddhism.

In September 2007 Myanmar attracted the world’s attention when in mass media appeared colorful images of hundreds of Buddhist monks during the protest marches through the streets of the cities. One of the important elements of the Buddhist monastic code is the principle of compassion and non-violence – Ahimsa. So an uprising against the military dictatorship in September 2007 in Myanmar that was actually led by tens of thousands Buddhist monks, aroused so much interest in the world. The colorful brightness and singularity of this protest gave rise to Western media calling these events “saffron revolution”[2].

Myanmar's Muslims are a diverse mosaic. There are at least four ethnically distinct Muslim communities in the country, all of which are Sunni. The ethnically Chinese Hui, with roots in Yunnan, reside in Mandalay and in the north of Myanmar. Indian and Pakistani Muslims, who arrived with the British colonial rule, can still found all over the country, most commonly in Yangon and Mandalay. The ethnically Burman Muslims were converted in the same wave with Thailand and Malaysia between 9th and 14th centuries by Indian and Arab traders and preachers and they currently live on the central plain. The largest (about one million people) and well known today as “the most oppressed group” in the world − Muslim ethnic group in Myanmar is Bengali Muslims[3], they live in southwest Rakhine (Arakan) State (their self-designation is Rohingyas)[4].

Most of Burmese Muslims are descendants of Muslim Indian immigrants married to Burmese wives. They were almost indistinguishable from the Burmese but they retained their religion. In 1941, for the first time, they were listed in the census, taken that year, as Burma Muslims[5] while Rakhine (Arakan) Muslims were listed as Bengalis that is as non-indigenous people without citizenship rights.

Burmese Muslims are the Muslims of a Buddhist country their day to day life goes in line with the Buddhist way of life. Some residents chose Islam for pragmatic reasons. Members of the Islamic diaspora help their coreligionists in getting employment and provide them with the initial capital to build their own business. Children can get good education in schools financed by the funds of rich oil countries of the Middle East, and then they can get free education at the universities in Arab countries. Children educated there and returned home are already very different from their parents by appearance and their outlook. They have returned with connections in the Islamic world, sometimes with a target capital.

Under the military regime of General Ne Win (1962−1988) religious tension in Burma had lessened. Burma was even regarded as one of the most religiously tolerant countries. However, history of coexistence of Muslims and Buddhists in the country had notably changed during the reign of the “new military junta” (1988−2010). In the second half of the 90-s special literature which contributed to an increase of anti-Islamic sentiments among the Buddhist population began to appear. It urged women devoted to Buddhism not to marry Muslims and to boycott the shops owned by Muslims. These brochures were widely distributed in Yangon, Mandalay and other cities). As Burmese journalist-emigrant noted in the article “Freedom of Religion in Burma”, “this literature and dramatically negative comments about Islam and Muslims were made in order to wake up Burmese nationalism based on Buddhism”[6]. Those years have also been witnessing attacks on the representatives of the Muslim diaspora across the country. The army didn’t stop the rioters therefore Islamic leaders were confident that these pogroms were organized by an omnipotent military intelligence of Myanmar regarded as the nerve center of the military regime in the country.

When another anti-Muslim pamphlet “The Fear of Losing One's Race” (In Burmese − Myo Pyauk Hmar Soe Kyauk Sa Yar) was published in 2001 clashes between Muslims and Buddhists happened again in many towns of Myanmar. A prominent leader of anti-Islam movement monk Ashin Wirathu in an interview to “Asia Times” in September 2003, explained the reason of religious enmity with Muslims in Mandalay city: “We have had problems with Muslims-Pakistanis before, but they have become especially acute in recent years. They want Buddhist Myanmar to become an Islamic state. They want the whole of Asia to become Islamic so it would have to live according to their laws. Muslims are responsible for most of the crimes committed in our country: the opium trade, theft, rape. They want to deface and destroy images of Buddha like they did it in Afghanistan. Now they scoff at our national clothes – at lounge (male national dress in a skirt) they place obscene drawings. These disgusting things are brought from Islamic Malaysia”[7].

At the same time the military authorities had arrested and put in prison the most radical Buddhist nationalists. Monk Wirathu was arrested too. A year after the transfer of power to a civilian government in Myanmar conflicts between Muslim and Buddhist communities began to occur increasingly frequently getting a prolonged and massive nature. In 2012 in Rakhine state two massive clashes between Buddhist and Bengali Muslims (Rohingua) with an interval of three months have happened. Nearly 200 people were killed and tens of thousands from both sides became displaced.

Rape and murder of a 26-year old Buddhist girl by three Muslims (Rohingua) provided the occasion for the conflict. This incident had turned the Rakhine (Arakan) state into an arena of fierce clashes between the Buddhist (Rakhine) and Muslim (Rohingua). As it often happens in the world’s history any conflict between representatives of different denominations usually takes a religious overtone. The world press began to write about inter-religious conflict (sectarian strife) in Myanmar, Buddhist chauvinism, genocide and fascism. But the government and the opposition of Myanmar preferred the term inter-communal conflict (communal violence). Another outbreak of sectarian strife, this time with the Burmese Muslims − citizens of the country, happened in March 2013 in central Myanmar. The conflict started in a Muslim jewelry shop. An argument between the owner and two Buddhist customers over the price escalated into a fight, causing death of one Buddhist monk. This sparked off the unrest and a month-long sectarian violence. The toll was 43 people died. Usually the instigators of such domestic conflicts were Muslims.

Since the initial outbreak of violence between Rakhine Buddhists and the Bengali Muslims a minority living in Rakhine (Arakan) State in 2012, more clashes have broken out between the Burmese Buddhists and the Burmese Muslims around the country ranging from Meikthila in central Myanmar to Lashio in the Shan State.

In recent years a dramatic rise of anti-Islamic nationalist ideology among the Buddhists of Myanmar has been observed. In response to the events in Rakhine state and their biased interpretation abroad mobilization of the Buddhist community of the country has been seen in their quest to protect their religious values and traditional way of life. Initially, this mobilization existed in the form of socio-religious movement “969”, and then it took structural shape in the form of the MaBaTa organization.

The leader and ideologist of the anti-Islamic movement a 49-year old monk Ashin Wirathu in 2003 had been sentenced to 25 year in prison for “inciting sectarian strife”, but after 8 years of confinement in January 2012 during the General amnesty to political prisoners he was released on the wave of democratic reforms. His followers say that Ashin Wirathu is a very charming and charismatic leader. When an article entitled “Extremist Buddhist monks persecute religious minorities” was published in the US in July issue of the “Time” with Ashin Wirathu face placed on the cover page with a caption inscription “The face of Buddhist terror”[8], this has caused an outrage in Myanmar and demands of an apology from the magazine[9]. On the official website of the President of Myanmar it was stated that “such a publication is harmful to interreligious relations in the country and promotes the wrong understanding of Buddhism – the main religion of the people of Myanmar for the last Millennium”. President Thein Sein came to the defense of monk Wirathu as a representative of Buddhist clergy. The President also denied that the government had carried out discriminatory policy against Muslims. “Although the majority of Myanmar’s population are Buddhists the government respects article 362 of the Constitution”[10]. The government had banned the distribution of the July (2013) issue of the magazine to prevent riots on religious grounds.

Foreign journalists called Ashin Wirathu “Burmese bin Laden” and “Buddhist radical” but he says that he is fighting for the preservation of the Buddhist religion and of the Burmese nation from the onslaught of radical Muslims who are buying up a land in the country and have significantly more children than Buddhists. He is convinced that the threat of Islamization goes far beyond trade sector and the infiltration of Muslims is seen in the seats of authorities and even in Aung San Suu Kyi surrounding.

The most visible playmaker in this arena is the Buddhist nationalist organization Ma Ba Tha. It was formed in January 2014 and has its own periodical, a time slot for sermons on TV channel, and over 250 branches all over the country.

Shortly after their formation, the group proposed a legislative package, commonly referred to as the Race and Religion Protection Law, that was intended to stop marriages between Muslim grooms and Buddhist brides because the latter would have to lose their religion after marriage. This proposal won popular support and got 2.5 million signatures in favor of such legislation.

Following the mass campaign of Buddhist radicals in 2014 the president asked Parliament to develop a package of four bills informally called “Protection of Race and Religion,” that had to regulate childbirth and interfaith, to control conversions from one faith to another and to prohibit polygamy. On February 19th, 2015 the Upper House of Myanmar’s Parliament passed the first Population Control Bill of the package, initiated by the Buddhist movement. The bill gave the authorities the right to determine the regions where women are not allowed to give birth to children more than once every three years. It is clear that this bill is aimed primarily at population control among Muslim Bengali (Rohingya) families, which usually have 10 - 15 children. In August Parliament passed two final Bills. Though the bills contained no explicit mention of Islam, the laws are designed to stop Muslims having multiple wives, large families and marrying Buddhist women. In a word this legislation had to halt what a leading monk has called the Islamic “invasion” of the country. On the first Sunday of October tens of thousands of Buddhist monks and their supporters gathered on Yangon stadium to celebrate the passage of four bills through parliament and thousands more watched their triumph on the bill-board screens outside.

Until recently nobody in Myanmar impeded the Muslims to practice their religious ceremonies. But during the last couple of years Muslim business related to Kurban Bairam sacrifices has become the target of anti-Islamic radical Buddhists. Since late 2013 dozens of Muslim owned slaughterhouses and beef-processing facilities across the Irrawaddy delta were shut down with the support of local officials. All the licenses were sold to members of Ma Ba Tha, dozens of thousands dollars for that purpose were raised from the congregation in Irrawaddy delta and donated to buying up requisite licenses. Sheep breeding is not developed in the country due to geographic conditions. Thousands of cows were seized from their Muslim owners, many were donated as draft animals to poor Irrawaddy farmers but mostly were send to Arakan (Rakhain) State on the South-West of the country to the Buddhist community. A campaign by members of the nationalist group Ma Ba Tha to shut down cattle slaughterhouses is not the first Buddhist monk-led campaign to save cows from slaughter in Burma. At the turn of the 20th century influential abbot Ledi Sayadaw espoused the idea that Burmese Buddhists should stop killing cattle because farmers depended on cattle. The cows (bovines) work in the fields, they sustain farmers with the milk and they are the worthy capital for the Burmese. According to the abbot, British colonial administrators posed a threat to Burma’s cattle, as they had no qualms about eating beef. He didn’t target Muslims; it was the British that he was worried about. They would set up abattoirs and kill all the buffaloes in the fields (to eat them). The beef boycott movement became very successful and took on particular strength in its significance for Burmese nationalists seeking independence from Britain. In 1961 under Prime Minister U Nu, who was a devout Buddhist, the government enacted a law that largely banned the slaughter of cattle. The law required Muslims to apply for special licenses to slaughter cattle on religious holidays. As stated by U Nu’s daughter, her father never intended to discriminate against Muslims but he banned killing cattle out of his convictions about bovines which echoed those of Ledi Sayadaw. Despite this history of protecting the bovines many restaurants in Myanmar serve beef and many people, including monks, have no problem with eating it. Opinions are divided even among the clergy over the importance of abstaining from beef or meet in general. Apparently Ashin Wirathu tried to raise the issue of whether mass slaughter of animals for religious purposes should be banned to provoke a negative reaction from the audience about coming Muslim Eid al-Adha festival, which entails ritual cattle slaughter. Shortly before Eid al-Adha celebrations in September 2015 the Upper Myanmar branch of Ma Ba ha sent an official letter of request to the divisional government bodies calling to put an end to the practice of ritual cattle sacrifice. “On the occasion of Eid, we feel very uncomfortable to see that many cows, including farm cows, are mercilessly beheaded. Each year we lose many cows, the working companion of farmers and a true benefactor of human beings” – the letter read. It was signed by four leading Buddhist monks, including Ashin Wirathu, and cited the teaching of Ledi Sayadaw. The Mandalay Division government has accepted the request of Buddhist nationalists to prevent ritual cattle slaughter for Friday’s celebration and had asked Muslims instead of cows to sacrifice goats and to cut the numbers of slaughtered animals down by half. “We don’t want to affect their religion, but our country has a Buddhist majority. We are supposed to fulfil the request of the majority”, − explained a senior official from the local government[11].

Ma Ba Tha is proving to be one of the most effective groups in Myanmar at extracting concessions from the quasi-civilian government. Their ability to exert political pressure on the government stands in stark contrast to the plight of rights groups and lawmakers who have met with little success at pushing for political reforms, including constitutional change.

The nationalist Buddhist group contends that no one within the government is backing them and that they are free and independent. But the fact that parliament passed several highly discriminatory “Race and Religious Protection” laws shows that ideological support of the group exists at the highest levels of power. Anyway the organization has considered the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party as tactical ally and openly supported it on Myanmar’s general election (held on November 8, 2015). At the same time Ma Ba Tha slandered the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) as Muslim-loving, unpatriotic troublemakers and inexperienced to lead the country, leaders of the nationalist organization Ma Ba Tha, overtly attacked Suu Kyi and her party for failing to support the “Race and Religion Protection Laws”, claiming that the incumbent government should have one more term. Ma Ba Tha affiliated monks were among those who called on the public not to vote for the NLD because the party was supposedly pro-Muslim.

A month before the elections NLD began to look for ways of reconciliation with the Ma Ba Tha. On 30th of September a meeting was held between Ashin Wirathu and NLD Vice-President, general Tin U.*) Photos of 88-year old retired general respectfully sitting on the floor in front of Ashin Wirathu, who was 40 years younger were published in the media. The fact of this meeting and the publication of the pictures and video had to shake off the accusations that the NLD was a threat to Buddhism in Myanmar. Indeed, there was not a single Muslim on the lists of candidates from the NLD, same as in the lists of the ruling party. Out of 6 thousand candidates for Parliament there were only 10 Muslims included in the lists[12].

Although the monks in Myanmar cannot vote they are nonetheless a potentially powerful political force that could guide voters towards supporting a particular party though Article 364 of the Constitution prohibits the use of religion for political purposes. Serious Ma Ba Tha’s intention to influence political processes in the country is proved by the registration of nationalist Buddhist National Prosperity Party (NPP) 4 month before elections in July 2015. The former advisor for President of Myanmar who had retired especially for that for that purpose in the beginning of 2015, who is also a big businessman, became the founder of the party. Members of the NPP party were only Buddhists and among them many influential and rich people can be found.

The new Buddhist party NPP has nominated 353 candidates. At the presentation ceremony of the party one of its leaders said: “Our country is the last stronghold of Theravada Buddhism. Our goal is to protect our religion and our people”. In the future the members of the NPP intend to change the electoral legislation. In Myanmar members of religious orders are barred from casting a vote. But related election laws only cover three religions – Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism. The prohibition does not affect Muslim religious leaders known as Mawlawi because they are not religious clergy and they can marry and have children. New party leader is going to raise the issue to grant suffrage to Buddhist monks and to other religious leaders[13].

The results of voting has demonstrated the landslide victory of the NLD. This opposition party won 887 of 1150 seats in the general elections on November 8th 2015. The former ruling USDP came as a distant second, winning 117 seats in the Union Parliament and in regional legislatures, while the National Prosperity Party (NPP) supported by Buddhist nationalists got zero[14]. But what does it mean? The majority of Burmese, voted for the NLD, not because they do not hold concerns over the Rohindgya and, or do not care about Muslim influence in general, but simply because they detest military dictatorship. There are many educated urban youths who support the NLD but harbor anti-Muslim sentiments at the same time. They voted for the NLD because their nationalist feelings had been outweighed by their desire to see a change in the government. They voted for change.

When Suu Kyi’s party takes power next year, they will face competing pressures: to meet the international expectations, to recognize the Rohingya and to quell religious nationalism, or at least to demonstrate to its domestic audience that the party is equally determined to “protect” Buddhism.

Once the NLD is in power the new government will be forced to take a clear stand on the issue of Islam in general and on “Rohingua” in particular, especially when anti-Muslim sentiment rears its head anew in 2016. If the NLD takes steps to recognize Rohingya as citizens or try to roll back the race and religion laws, Ma Ba Tha will undoubtedly speak out strongly against it. It is yet to be seen how much the general public would tolerate a softer line toward Rohingya. Whenever Thein Sein and other officials insist that Rohingya are not citizens of Myanmar, they are greeted with widespread cheers from nationalists. Aung San Suu Kyi herself has been silent on the issue; presumably a political calculation ahead of the election. While in opposition, Aung San Suu Kyi could have avoided commenting on the issue. But she will not be afforded such a license while her party is in office. But during the last five years Aung San Suu Kyi had proved herself to be a solid pragmatic politician with national interests being her high priority. An immediate task for the new government is to achieve national reconciliation and to lead the peace building process within the country.


[1] Simoniya A.A. Myanmar: the nationwide census as preparation for general elections // South East Asia: the actual problems of development. Number XXII−XXIII. Moscow, 2014. P. 67−68.

[2] Simoniya A.A. “Myanmar: Heated September 2007”. − in: “Asia and Africa Today”, 2008. No. 1. P. 2−9.

[3] The problem of Rohingua look: Simoniya A.A. “Who are the Rohingua ?” in: “Asia and Africa Today”, 2009, No.11. P. 27−31; Simoniya A.A.”Myanmar 2012: ethno-religious conflict in the South-West of the country”. − in: “Asia and Africa Today”, 2013, No. 2. P.18−22; Simoniya A.A. “Buddhist radicalism in Myanmar”. − in: “Asia and Africa Today”, 2014, No. 5. P. 27−32.

[4] Myanmar’s authorities have banned the use of the term “the Rohingua people”, considering them Bengalis, who illegally infiltrated into the territory of Myanmar and therefore do not have citizenship. In the second half of the 1970s, Muslim separatists tried to fight for the secession of Arakan State and for its union with Bangladesh. This is the only issue on which there are no differences among all members of society from the government to the opposition. Foreign politicians and NGO workers, who use the term “the Rohingua people” and accusations of Myanmar of discrimination against those people often sparks discontent and even outrage among the country’s Buddhists. International non-governmental and human rights organization voice support for the country’s Bengali population (Rohingya people), who receive various forms of humanitarian assistance on an ongoing basis. Most Islamic countries provide financial and moral support, but no state has offered shelter to them.

[5] Thompson Virginia, Adloff Richard. Minority problems in Southeast Asia. Stanford (CA), 1955. P. 70.

[6] Khin Maung Win. Religious Freedom in Burma: A Devisive and Suppressive Practice of the military regime // Legal Issues on Burma Journal (Bangkok), No. 4, October 1999. P. 20−22.

[7] Cem Ozturk. Myanmar’s Muslim sideshow // Asia Times Online. Oct. 21, 2003.

[8] Time, July 1, 2013, Vol. 182, No. 1.

[9] Anger over Time’s “Buddhist terror” story // Bangkok Post, 24.06.2013

[10] Burmese leader defends “anti- Muslim” monk Ashin Wirathu // BBC News Asia, 24.06.2013.

[11] Mandalay Govt to prevent Muslim holiday cattle slaughter // The Irrawaddy. 23.09.2015.

[12] Fisher Jonah. Myanmar’s MaBaTha monks flex their political muscle // BBC News. 8 October 2015.

[13] Hay Mar Non. Newcomer to party politics pushes voting rights for monks // The Irrawaddy. 13.10.2015.

[14] Tallying the Triumph: NLD’s appeal knows almost no bounds // The Irrawaddy. 23.11.2015.

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